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The poor enforcement and effectiveness of environmental impact assessment (EIA) on construction and
investment projects in China has long been blamed for not preventing environmental pollution and
degradation. At the same time, freezing EIA approval of all new projects in an administrative region,
introduced in 2006 as a punishment for failing to meet regional environmental quality targets, has been
regarded as an innovative administrative instrument used by higher level environmental authorities on
local governments. But it also raised controversies. Applying an environmental authoritarianism
perspective, this study analyzed the legitimacy and environmental effectiveness of freezing EIA approval
procedures by reviewing all 25 national cases and 12 provincial cases of so-called EIA Restrictions Tar-
geting Regions between 1 December 2006 and 31 December 2013. The results show that such an
environmental authoritarian measure is to some extent environmentally effective but lacks legality and
transparency towards and participation of third parties, and hence falls short in legitimacy. Legal
foundations and wider third party participation are essential for the long term effectiveness of this policy
and its transfer to other countries.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In most industrializing and industrialized countries many
environmental policy and governance instruments are aimed at
emission control of individual point sources. The environmental
licenses/permits, emission standards and environmental impact
assessments (EIA) of new industrial investments are some of the
most successful instruments in regulating emissions of polluting
industries. Through these instruments companies that do not
behave according to the set emission requirements face sanctions,
ultimately resulting in losing their license to produce. But for a
region, in the end it is the total amount of emissions of all polluting
sources and the total resulting ambient environmental quality that
counts. An increasing number of countries, including China, faces
problems in protecting and safeguarding regional environmental
quality, as the sum of individual polluting companies that produce
according to emissions requirements might result in ambientenvironmental quality above standards. Individual polluters can
then not be held responsible for the overall deterioration of
ambient (air and water) quality in a region, and governmental au-
thorities often lack instruments to intervene.
Since 2007 the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection
(MEP) has developed and implemented a new and unprecedented
strategy to cope with this problem of ambient environmental
quality exceeding ambient environmental standards in a speciﬁc
region. If an administrative region (usually a county) does not fulﬁll
environmental quality requirements as formulated in prevailing
standards or not enforce EIA law or other pollution prevention and
control regulations, all new EIA application documents (including
EIA reports, statements and registration forms) on (expanding or
new) economic projects with signiﬁcant environmental impacts in
that region are not taken into consideration by the relevant au-
thorities (often the MEP or a provincial Environmental Protection
Bureau (EPB)). That means that these new investment projects will
not be judged against the pertaining emissions standards and
construction of new or expanding of existing economic activities
cannot start (as no EIA will be handed out, a requirement for
starting a construction project with potentially severe
1 Gilley (2012: 288) uses a similar concept of “authoritarian environmentalism”
to describe the ‘public policy model that concentrates authority in a few executive
agencies manned by capable and uncorrupt elites seeking to improve environ-
mental outcomes. Public participation is limited to a narrow cadre of scientiﬁc and
technocratic elites while others are expected to participate only in state-led
mobilization for the purposes of implementation.’
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ronmental Impact Assessment Restriction Targeting Regions
(EIARTR, Quyu Xianpi). Such a suspension of approval of EIA in a
region puts signiﬁcant pressure on local authorities prioritizing
local economic development. Lifting the restriction to take EIA into
consideration is put conditional to improvement of local ambient
(air and/or water) quality or recovery from severe environmental
damage.
This new measure to safeguard regional environmental quality
is not without discussion (Zhu and Moser, 2014). Questions have
been raised regarding the legitimacy and environmental effec-
tiveness of these measures, especially by local authorities con-
fronted with these suspensions of EIA approval. Can individual
companies planning to invest being refrained from decision-
making on their environmental impact assessment following
behavior of other companies? In addition, EIA has always been seen
as an instrument that involves third parties in decision making on
new economic investments with potential environmental impacts.
In China, EIA has become one of the ﬁrst policies with experiments
on public hearings, be it with mixed experiences (Tang et al., 2005;
Zhao, 2010; Li et al., 2012; Johnson, 2013). But the EIA restriction
targeting regions does not seems to allow for any third party
participation, a setback in China's germinating attempts in partic-
ipatory environmental policy making and implementation. This
article reviews this new Chinese policy of EIARTR and investigates
its legitimacy and environmental effectiveness. The next section
discusses democracy and authoritarianism and develops a frame-
work for assessing the legitimacy of China's EIARTR. With the his-
torical background of EIARTR provided in Section 3, Section 4
assesses the legality, environmental effectiveness, transparency
and third party engagement in EIARTR. Section 5 concludes with
suggestions for improving the legitimacy of EIARTR.
2. Environmental democracy, environmental
authoritarianism and China's EIA
2.1. Environmental governance: democracy and authoritarianism
First developed and applied in the context of liberal-democratic
political systems (the US in 1970s and later in European countries),
EIA has always been strongly related to notions of information
disclosure and public participation in environmental decision-
making. In these industrialized countries EIA has been a crucial
instrument to include environmental considerations more fully
into decision-making on economic projects and plans. At the same
time, EIA was considered as part of democratic decision-making on
future projects and plans, as all information necessary for decision-
making was collected and disclosed and the public could partici-
pate and be involved in discussing the environmental challenges of
such future developments (Stewart and Sinclair, 2007;
O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). Stewart and Sinclair (2007), for instance,
have pointed at a wide range of beneﬁts of EIA, including the
involvement of local communities at an early stage of decision
making; the access to scientiﬁc and local knowledge and the
sharing of environmental information; the role of EIA as a vehicle
for individual and community empowerment; and hence its
contribution to a more equal distribution of power in society.
Because of these features EIA has become widely institutionalized
in most western democracies.
In many developing and transitional economies EIA has been
introduced much later and/or enforced to a lesser extent. In China,
for instance, although EIA was mentioned already in the Environ-
mental Protection Law 1979, EIA had not become one of the major
policy instruments in environmental governance for projects until
1998, following the Regulations on the Environmental ProtectionAdministration of Construction Projects by the State Council, and for
planning until 2003, when the Law on Environmental Impact
Assessment was enacted (Zhu, 2011). Also here, EIA was introduced
with the promises of both including the environment better and
more fully into decision making on major projects and plans, and
contributing to environmental information disclosure and public
participation. Quite a few scholars explored the environmental
effectiveness of EIA in China from the perspective of public
participation and more democratic decision-making, to assess
whether EIA empowers the environmental and community in-
terests and groups that are too often ignored in China's infra-
structure and investment projects and plans (e.g. Tang et al., 1997;
Yang, 2008; Zhao, 2010; Li et al., 2012; Johnson, 2013; He et al.,
2014). Regardless of often reported failures of EIA to live after
these promises in the practice of China's policy making, the
fundamental idea and design of EIA has remained, in China as well
as in many other countries.
The idea that a close correlation exists between better envi-
ronmental decision-making and more public participation and in-
formation disclosure is not restricted to EIA. In comparative
environmental politics a long tradition exist of studying more
generally the relation between regime type and the performance of
environmental governance (e.g. Josephson, 2004; Buitenzorgy and
Mol, 2010; Gilley, 2012). Quite some scholars have argued, with
theoretical and empirical arguments, that democratic political
systems show a better performance in environmental governance
compared to less democratic systems, due to the former's high
information ﬂow and meaningful public participation in policy
making processes (Payne, 1995; Barrett and Graddy, 2000; Farzin
and Bond, 2006; Winslow, 2005; Humphrey, 2007). More
recently, under conditions of a more severe environmental crisis,
the better environmental performance of liberal democracies has
come under attack. Some scholars have argued that politicians in
liberal democracies focus on short-term developmental goals at the
cost of solving long term environmental problems such as climate
change (e.g. Midlarsky, 1998; Shearman and Smith, 2007). Others
have asserted that public participation can endanger sound envi-
ronmental policy making when lay people lack the capability to
handle complex information and technical knowledge (Lawrence,
2003), and that transparency is not always facilitating better
environmental performance (Mol, 2010; Gupta and Mason, 2014).
The concept of environmental authoritarianism was recently
coined to bring together these doubts on democracy as a favorable
and capable environmental decision-making and governance
model (Shearman and Smith, 2007; Beeson, 2010).1 Authoritarian
governance might be the result or consequence of severe envi-
ronmental degradation as ‘political elites come to privilege regime
maintenance and internal stability over political liberalization.’
(Beeson, 2010: 276). By the same token, a central undemocratic
state may prove to be essential for major responses to the growing,
complex and global environmental challenges. Especially in East
and Southeast Asia, where the authoritarian tradition is deeply
embedded in the cultural, social and political systems, environ-
mental authoritarianismmight be more likely to prevail, to form an
(effective) answer to mounting environmental challenges. Beeson
(2010) uses China's birth control policy as an example how
authoritarian rule has contributed to environmental mitigation. But
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local leaders, which is the authoritarian way of China's Communist
Party to reward local cadres for faithful implementation of central
policies, hinders stringent environmental policy outcome as ofﬁ-
cials with a short time horizon follow a quick and low quality
implementation approach.
The debate on environmental authoritarianism versus envi-
ronmental democracy has mostly taken place at the level of po-
litical systems. However, here it will be used at a much more
tangible level of a concrete policy instrument recently developed
and applied in China, the so-called EIARTR. As will be illustrated
and argued below, China's EIARTR can be interpreted as an envi-
ronmental policy modiﬁcation that moves away from the long-
time structural afﬁnity within EIA between environmental inter-
est representation and democracy, and towards the afﬁnity be-
tween environmental interest representation and authoritarian
rule.2 The three simultaneous principle “… requires that the design, construction, and
operation of any required pollution control technologies or systems must be
completed at the same time as the design, construction, and operation of the
balance of the project components.” (McElwee, 2011: 57; see also Wang, 2012: 32).2.2. Assessing environmental authoritarianism in EIA
As can be distilled from the literature, authoritarian forms of
environmental governance are often challenged against two sets of,
partly interdependent, criteria. First, authoritarianism is challenged
against criteria of legitimacy, especially because the alternative
modeldenvironmental democracydis often considered to have
high levels of legitimacy. Second, and equal to environmental de-
mocracy, environmental authoritarianism is challenged against
criteria of environmental effectiveness: does it effectively
contribute to mitigation of environmental problems?
The two criteria are not independent as high levels of environ-
mental effectiveness might result in more legitimacy. In contrast to
environmental democracy, environmental authoritarianism de-
rives its legitimacy mainly from its effectiveness in protecting the
environment, and less so from procedural forms of public
involvement, participation and transparency in environmental
governance. Moreover, environmental authoritarianism doesn't
always come with the rule of law, as the implementation and
enforcement of stringent environmental measures can follow from
political decisions by elites. Hence, in assessing China's EIARTR a
broad deﬁnition of legitimacy will be applied, where legitimacy is
understood as the product of legality of the measure, the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of the measure, and transparency and
public participation and involvement in designing and operating
the measure.
The original data and information on the included EIARTR
cases were disclosed on the website of the Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection of the People's Republic of China (MEP)
(http://www.zhb.gov.cn/) until December 31, 2013, and on the
websites of the provincial level EPBs until September 1st, 2013.
We selected Luzhou in Sichuan Province for an in-depth analysis,
as it was the ﬁrst EIARTR case nationally (December 2006). In-
formation on the Luzhou case was obtained through ﬁeldwork in
Luzhou during July 2012 by the ﬁrst author. An in-depth inter-
view with the director of Luzhou EPB, and two focused work-
shops with representatives from the local EPB, the Work Safety
Supervision Bureau, the Court, the legislation ofﬁce of Luzhou
municipal government, the Statistics Bureau, the Development
and Reform Commission, and the Industrial and Information
Bureau. At the central level, ofﬁcials from the Legal Ofﬁce and the
Environmental Supervision and Investigation Bureau of MEP
were interviewed. The Bureau of Environmental Supervision and
Investigation of MEP assisted in our review of the 25 central
government level EIARTR cases and have published the overview
data set on all cases on their website.3. EIA restriction in China
EIA Restriction Targeting Regions is an administrative measure
taken by Chinese state or provincial level environmental protection
administration departments to suspend approval of all EIA docu-
ments on construction and investment projects in an administra-
tive region, except for pollution prevention, recycling and
ecological restoration projects. From the cases of EIARTR that have
been reported it proves that the state or provincial environmental
protection administration issues such an administrative measure
for an entire administrative region when the implementation rate
of the environmental impact assessment is low; the three simul-
taneous system2 is not fully implemented; the reduction targets for
total amount of major pollutant emissions are not completed in
time and according to schedule; the total amount of pollutants is
higher than ambient environmental control indicators and/or
standards; serious environmental pollution accidents happen (too)
many times; and/or the potential environmental risk is considered
too high.3.1. The background of EIA restriction targeting regions
There have been two main reasons behind the development of
EIA restriction: the poor functioning of EIA Law implementation
and the difﬁculties of national and provincial environmental pro-
tection administrations to control total ambient environmental
quality in a region.
For a long time, local industrial development in China has been
driven primarily by local, departmental and private interests and
has too often ignored the national policies that emphasize envi-
ronmental protection, resource conservation, human health,
adjustment of the economic structure and transformation of eco-
nomic growth pattern. Hence iron and steel, metallurgy, electric
power, chemical and other energy and resource intensive and
highly polluting industries have been expanding rapidly and largely
uncontrolled, without much restrictions regarding their impacts on
the local and regional environment (e.g. He et al., 2014). At the same
time, national and provincial authorities faced the task to manage
regional ambient environmental quality, which is often endangered
by the sum of economic activities in an area.
The current EIA Law was adopted by the 30th session of the
Standing Committee of the 9th National People's Congress on 28
October 2002, and took effect on 1 September 2003. This legislation
on the contents and procedures of EIA marked the maturity of the
system of environmental impact assessments. In China “EIA refers
to the methods and institutions for analyzing, predicting and
appraising the impacts resulting from human activities after pro-
grams and construction projects (e.g. infrastructure construction
projects, technological transformation projects and regional
development construction projects), so as to propose counter-
measures for preventing or mitigating the unfavorable impacts and
minimizing the adverse effects” (Zhu, 2011: 85). Environmental law
scholars in China generally consider EIA one of the main embodi-
ments of the prevention principle, and an instrument to optimize
the industrial structure through implementing energy conservation
and emissions reduction (e.g. Zhu, 2011).
However, in practice, the EIA Law in China does not always work
well. Often, construction and investment projects start before
receiving EIA approval. For example, during the so-called “EIA
Fig. 1. Average annual EIARTR (in days, left axis) and annual number of regions
affected by EIARTR (right axis) by national environmental authorities, 2007 till 2013.
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former State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA, since
2008 the Ministry of Environmental Protection), all of which failed
to carry out an EIA as the law requires.3 Pan Yue, then the deputy
director-general of the former SEPA, admitted that projects which
were stopped in the past because they had no EIA often resumed
after completing the formalities but subsequently used a variety of
tactics to delay or refuse implementing environmental protection
measures.4 And according to a survey of environmental protection
administrative department staff at provincial and lower levels in
2007 (Wang, 2011), nearly 40% of the respondents believed that in
their own administrative area over 40% of the companies that need
an EIA receive it only after construction started, a so-called post-
EIA. “Sichuan EPA staff admitted that in the province 50% of the
projects do not have an EIA, 30% of the projects have post-EIA and
only 20% of the projects have an EIA according to the rules. Almost
all EIAs of Shuangliu County of Sichuan province are post-EIAs.”
(Wang, 2011: 85). Hence, EIA Law enforcement has shown limited
effectiveness in China.
The year 2006 proved to be quite severe for China's environ-
mental situation. During that year 161 serious environmental
pollution accidents took place; environmental complaints of citi-
zens increased to 60 million, 30% higher than in 2005; and the
energy and pollution emission reduction targets of the State
Council for 2006 (4% and 2% below 2005, respectively) were not
achieved. Environmental issues were also widely believed to
become a major bottleneck for China's economic and social
development. In 2006 alone SEPA stopped 163 projects which
affected the environment, using EIA procedures. The investment of
these high energy consumption and pollution projects, mostly in
steel, thermal power and petrochemical industries, involved in-
vestments of RMB 7700 billion (USD 1266 billion).
In addition to these problems with implementing EIA for indi-
vidual projects and plans, state and provincial environmental
protection authorities faced also difﬁculties with managing total
environmental pollution and ambient environmental quality in an
area. While individual industrial or construction projects might
fulﬁll legal requirements on emissions, the total emissions in a
region could still ran out of control and exceed ambient environ-
mental quality standards or targets. In order to maintain authority
and macro-control of ambient environmental quality and curb
blind expansion of high energy consuming and high polluting in-
dustries, the State Council issued on 3 December 2005 the Decision
of Carrying out Scientiﬁc Development and Strengthening Envi-
ronmental Protection of State Council (State Council document no.
39, 2005). The twenty-ﬁrst paragraph of this document points at
the need to strictly implement EIA and the ‘three simultaneous’
system and even to suspend approval of construction projects with
major pollutant discharges and impact on ecology in areas/regions
where the total pollutant amount exceeds the standards and policy
indicators, results in severe ecological destruction, or where
ecological restoration tasks have not been completed. This formed
the ﬁrst ofﬁcial document that mentioned the possibility of sus-
pension of EIA approval for an entire region; hence a collective
punishment instead of punishing only one company or project.3 See Wang Ling (2005), State Environmental Protection Administration Whips
Up the EIA StormdInterview with Pan Yue, the deputy director-general of SEPA,
Economic Daily, January 21, 2005.
4 See SEPA news release on State Environmental Protection Administration an-
nounces 112.3 billion valued environmentally illegal projects, ﬁrst time using
EIARTR to stop highly polluted industry. http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/
200910/t20091023_180045.htm, accessed October 1, 2012.3.2. The historical use of EIA restriction
The ﬁrst environmental protection administration to use mea-
sures to restrict EIA approval for a regionwas the Sichuan Provincial
Environmental Protection Bureau (Sichuan EPB), who decided on
26 December 2006, on a regional restriction of approval of the
environmental impact assessments in Luzhou City. On November
15 of that year a diesel oil spill pollution incident occurred in
Luzhou power plant, which caused the Luzhou urban waterworks
to stop intake of water and affected water provisioning of parts of
Chongqing. The SEPA identiﬁed the event as an extremely serious
and large environmental pollution accident.5 On the basis of Article
3 of the Decision on Further Strengthening Environmental Protec-
tion of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee and Sichuan Pro-
vincial People's Government (Sichuan Communist Party Committee
Document no. 38, 2004), Sichuan EPB decided on December 26 to
suspend EIA approval to all new construction projects, except
pollution management projects (Sichuan EPB Document no. 873,
2006). In China's history, this has been the ﬁrst use of the EIARTR.
On 20 February 2007, on the basis of the Notice on Relieving Re-
strictions on Luzhou's New Construction Projects of Sichuan Environ-
mental Protection Bureau (Sichuan EPB Document no. 43, 2006),
Sichuan EPB lifted the regional restriction on EIA approval in
Luzhou.
On 10 January 2007, in carrying out environmental pollution
control policies and ensuring rapid and healthy development of the
national economy, and following the Decision of Carrying out Sci-
entiﬁc Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection
of State Council, the former SEPA applied for the ﬁrst time EIA
regional restriction. These EIARTRs were triggered by severe vio-
lations of EIA Law and/or “three simultaneous” requirements by 82
major projects with a total investment of RMB 112.3 billion (USD
18.5 billion). These projects were from 12 industrial sectors
including iron and steel, metallurgy, power generation and chem-
ical industries. Four administrative regions (Tangshan in Hebei,
Luliang in Shanxi, Laiwu in Shandong and Liupanshui in Guizhou)
were directly sanctioned with EIA restrictions. Since the four major
power generation groups addressed had operations in different
provinces, in total administrative regions in 22 provinces and
municipalities (under direct administration of the State Council)
were affected. According to Pan Yue, since 10 January 2007 when
SEPA enforced the ﬁrst EIA restrictions, SEPA strictly supervised and5 See SEPA (2006), “Notice on Investigation of Responsible Individuals for
Chuannan Power Co. Ltd, Luzhou Plant Gas-leakage Accident on November 15”,
Environmental Supervision document No.432006.
Table 1
EIARTR related provincial level governmental documents.
Province/
municipality











no Stipulates restriction conditions, duration and measures.
Shandong Shandong Environmental
Protection Bureau
“Opinions on further implementation
of EIA and three simultaneous
system”
July, 2007 no Stipulates conditions, implementing bodies and measures
Hubei Hubei Environmental Protection
Bureau




no Stipulates restriction conditions, decision making bodies,
lifting conditions
Hebei Hebei Environmental Protection
Bureau
“Measures for Environmental
Supervision and EIARTR (trial)”
November,
2007
no Stipulates restriction conditions, decision-making




“Measures for regional restrictions on
EIAs of construction projects (trial)”
August,
2008
no Stipulates decision making bodies, decision making
procedures, duration, lifting procedure, information
disclosure






no Stipulates restriction conditions, decision-making bodies,
supervision procedure, lifting procedure, information
disclosure
Henan Henan Environmental Protection
Bureau
“Construction project EIA restriction
management measures (trial)”
June, 2009 no Stipulates restriction conditions, decision-making bodies,









no Stipulates restriction conditions, decision-making bodies,
lifting procedures.
Shanxi Shanxi Standing Committee of
Communist Party Committee









June, 2011 Yes Stipulates conditions, decision-making bodies and
procedures, supervision, lifting procedure and bodies,
information disclosure.
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their projects. And EPBs at all levels carried out hundreds of on-site
inspections of the 82 projects in more than 20 provinces. This
ensured the implementation and rectiﬁcation of EIA. Through the
elimination and rectiﬁcation of some illegal projects, sulfur dioxide
emissions were expected to reduce by more than 19 million tons
per year.6
Between January 2007 and December 2013 environmental
administration authorities of the State Council decided on 25
batches of EIA Restrictions targeting 37 regions (see Fig. 17 and
Table 1). The mean restriction time for suspending EIA approval
was 90 days and the average number of restriction days 125.5; the
shortest restriction time (in Shandong Laiwu) was 34 days and the
longest restriction time was applied in Anhui Anqing (281 days).
The annual average restriction time steeply increased over the
years, with all cases in 2007 having a restriction time below 90
days. Besides the national environmental authority (SEPA/MEP),
also provincial environmental authorities applied EIA Restriction
Targeting Regions. Between December 2006 and December 2013 22
provincial-level administrative regions were targeted in 12 pro-
vincial decisions on batches of regional restriction on EIA approval
in 8 provincial areas (Sichuan Province, Shandong Province, Henan
Province, Zhejiang Province, Jiangsu Province, Liaoning Province,
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Guizhou Province). This
means that nomore than 25% of the provincial-level environmental
protection administrations in mainland China applied EIARTR.
Henan Province decided three times on regional restriction on EIA
approval, Zhejiang and Jiangsu Province each two times and the
others each one time. Provincial level restriction time varied more
widely compared to the national level decisions, between 62 days6 See SEPA news on Lifting EIA Restrictions on Luliang, Liupanshui and Huadian
Group, lessons learned for the future effort, http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/
200910/t20091023_180066.htm, accessed on October 1, 2012.
7 The average days of EIARTR over 2013 cannot be counted yet, as for some re-
gions the restrictions of EIA have not been lifted per 1 January 2014. For one of the
two 2013 batches, covering 3 regions, the average number of days was 102.(Luzhou Sichuan province) and 424 days (Shilong District, Ping-
dingshan, Henan Province). The average provincial level restriction
period was a little over 188 days.
4. Legitimacy of EIA restrictions targeting regions
The legitimacy of EIARTR can be assessed by analyzing its legal
basis, its effectiveness in preventing or reducing environmental
impacts (environmental effectiveness), and the transparency and
possibilities for public involvement and engagement in EIA
restrictions.
4.1. Legal basis
The provincial EPBs and the former SEPA started late 2006 and
in 2007 with the application of EIA Restriction Targeting Regions
without a clear legal basis. Only on 5 June, 2008, the MEP issued a
draft Management Measures for Environmental Impact Assessment
Restriction Targeting Regions (trial) to recruit comments (MEP
document no. 283, 2008). But this attempt to constitute a sound
legal basis for the EIARTR failed and up till now this legal document
was never approved by the MEP. At present there are two major
articles that can form a legal basis for EIARTR. Paragraph 4 of Article
18 of the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's
Republic of China (2008 Revision) provides that “For areas where
the total discharge of important water pollutants is larger than the
prescribed level, the administrative department of environmental
protection of the related People's government shall suspend the
examination and approval of the environmental impact assessment
documents of construction projects which increase the total
discharge of important water pollutants.” Furthermore, Article 30
of the 2009 Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment of
Planning by the State Council provides that “If the total discharge
volume of major pollutants in the area for the execution of a plan
exceeds the state or local indicator for the control of total discharge
volume, the plan preparation organ shall suspend examining and
approving any environmental impact assessment document on a
X. Zhu et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 92 (2015) 100e108 105new construction project which will increase the total discharged
volume of major pollutants in the aforesaid area for the execution
of the plan.” Except for these two articles, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a clear
legal basis for EIARTR.
However, these two articles mention but do not deﬁne and
concretely regulate the application of EIARTR. The two articles do
not refer to the scope of the application, the applicable conditions,
the procedure to start these EIA restrictions, the subject of appli-
cable decisions, the applicable time limit, the administrative
enforcement measures, the conditions for lifting the restriction, the
assessment procedure of acceptance, the procedures for lifting re-
striction, who can/should decide on lifting the restriction, the
disclosure of information and the participation of the public, and
oversight measures and liability rules of EIARTR. Therefore, in
practice the application of administrative measures on regional
restrictions of EIA approval not only lacks detailed procedural law,
but also lacks the necessary and effective legal oversight. For
example, as for revocation of EIARTR in restricted regions, lack of
clear substantial requirements and procedural rules leads to chaos
in timing when the subject who should decide to examine the steps
leading to revocation has no guidelines. Sometimes the decision-
maker already decided on revocation even before the subjects did
submit a formal application.8 Aforementioned practices do not
conform to administrative principles of a modern country under
the rule of law. Any administrative action by the government
should meet a set of substantial and formal requirements to start
the procedure, but these are absent in the case of EIARTR.
In many provincial-level administrative regions, the environ-
mental protection administrative departments or local govern-
ments laid down policy documents in referring to the
aforementioned draft Management Measures for Environmental
Impact Assessment Restriction Targeting Regions (trial), which do not
have legal binding force. According to a review of the ofﬁcial
websites of all provincial level governments for the period of
December 2006eJuly 2014, there were 10 provincial level govern-
ments who issued EIARTR related documents, of which only the
Regulation for Reducing Pollutants Emissions in Shanxi (2010) and the
EIARTR implementation measures for environmental protection (2011)
have legal binding force, while the others are only internal guiding
documents (see Table 1). For example, in 2007 Hebei EPB pioneered
(following the draft of this MEP document) with Provisional Mea-
sures of Environmental Protection Supervision and Regional Restric-
tion on EIA Approvals. These provisional measures specify the scope,
decision making procedure, conditions and procedure for lifting
restrictions. It also stipulates the types of regions that are subject to
EIA restriction, among which those that failed to complete a
determined reduction target; areas of serious ecological damage or
where ecological restoration tasks have not been completed; areas
that have seriously threatened environmentally sensitive down-
stream waters; areas with coal-ﬁred power plants that have not
implemented or completed on schedule sulfur dioxide pollution
control projects set by the state; or areas that did not fulﬁll
implementation of sewage treatment facilities according to the
legal conditions. The provincial document also details the speciﬁc
scope of application of provincial level regional restriction on EIA
approval, the decision-making process, the conditions for lifting the
restriction and the procedure.98 For example, in the case of EIARTR in Luzhou of Sichuan Province, the Luzhou
Municipal Government just reported their rectiﬁcation progress to Sichuan EPB,
instead of submitting an administrative application for revocation of EIARTR.
9 See Hebei pioneers in institutionalizing EIARTR with the trial implementation of
measures, http://www.law-star.com/cacnew/200711/65009655.htm, accessed on
October 1, 2012.As for local legislation that is legally binding, only Shanxi
Province enacted a rule referring to EIARTR, valid only within
Shanxi Province. On 29 September 2010, the Standing Committee of
the 11th Shanxi People's Congress approved the Regulation for
Reducing Pollutants Emissions in Shanxi, which took effect on 1
January 2011. Article 11 provides that environmental protection
departments above country level shall not examine and approve
environmental impact assessment documents on new pollutant-
emission construction projects in the following circumstances:
when the area fails to reach the environmental objectives in the key
supervision zone; when the governmental authorities fail to close
down outdated production facilities; or when established urban
sewage treatment facilities are not ran or operated stably. Similarly,
Chongqing Municipal Government issued EIARTR implementation
measures for environmental protection in 2011, which speciﬁes the
scope, procedures and information disclosure of EIARTR.
The MEP never stopped trying to pass a legal document by the
National People's Congress in which EIARTR would ﬁnd a formal
legal basis. One of these attempts is the recent amendment/revision
of the Environmental Protection Law. In August 2012, the 11th Na-
tional People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee deliberated the
draft Environmental Protection Law Amendment for the ﬁrst time,
and published it for public consultation and advice on NPC's web-
site. In a dramatic move to change the draft amended law, two
months after its public release MEP posted Comments and Sugges-
tions on the Draft EPL Amendment on its website10, containing 34
arguments against the 2012 draft amendment, which was followed
by further deliberations in the NPC in 2013 (He et al., 2013; Zhang
et al., 2013). One of the new EIARTR related articles added into the
deliberation through the intervention of MEP is that “for key re-
gions and watersheds that have exceeded quota of total emission
control of national major pollutants, the competent departments of
environmental protection administration under the State Council
and governments of provinces, autonomous regions and munici-
palities directly under the Central Government shall suspend the
approval of environmental impact assessment documents of con-
struction projects involving increase of total emission of major
pollutants.”11 By the end of 2013 the Environmental Protection Law
Revision12 still had the above EIARTR related new article. In April
2014, shortly before the Environmental Protection Law Revisionwas
submitted to NPC Standing Committee for the fourth (and ﬁnal)
reading, MEP suggested to add “regions that fail to meet the pre-
scribed national ambient quality standards” for EIARTRwith an aim
to increase the objectivity of the indicators that would decide the
applicability of EIARTR in a region. This suggested article was ﬁnally
included in the new Environmental Protection Law 2014 (Article
44.2), which, for the ﬁrst time, provides a legal principle for EIARTR.
With the coming into force of the Law on January 1, 2015, the
legitimacy and effectiveness of EIARTR will depend on how con-
crete accompanying regulations and measures will be further
formulated and detailed, for instance through revising the current
EIA Law 2008.
Besides the absence of a sound legal basis there is another legal
problemwith the EIARTR. All attempts to formulate a legal basis of
EIARTR point to the problem of regional emissions exceeding
ambient air and water quality standards. However, out of the 2510 MEP document no. 284, 2012, http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bh/201210/
t20121031_240778.htm, accessed 27 December 2013.
11 See for and English translation on the various proposed revisions: http://www.
wageningenur.nl/en/show/First-and-second-revision-drafts-of-the-1989-
Environmental-Protection-Law.htm, accessed 28 December 2013.
12 The NPC Standing Committee approved the change of legislation plan from
Environmental Protection Law Amendment to Environmental Protection Law Revision
in October 2013.
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(in Zhejiang Wenzhou; and in one decision targeting waste water
treatment in six provinces: Inner Mongolia Bayannur, Henan
Puyang, Hubei Xiangyang, Guangdong Jieyang, Hainan Dongfang,
Gansu Weiwu) respectively 1 provincial case (in Zhejiang) re-
strictions were applied because of excessive total regional air and/
or water emission or ambient quality standards. In all other cases of
EIARTR some urgency situation, environmental accident, or low
percentage of approved EIAs formed the reason for applying these
restrictive measures. Hence, the measure is hardly used for the
target for which it was originally meant, but rather as a measure to
combat general environmental misbehavior in a region.4.2. Environmental effectiveness
Legitimacy of EIARTR can be enhancedwhen thesemeasures are
environmentally effective.While it is impossible to execute a sound
and causal environmental effectiveness analysis of the EIA restric-
tion measures, anecdotal evidencedbased on interviews, media
reports and (in) formal documents up till nowddoes point to
several (indirect) environmental effects of these measures. Six ar-
guments for environmental effectiveness of EIARTR will be
assessed here.
First, EIARTR has forced local leaders to attach importance to
environmental protection and has changed their behavior with
respect to implementation of environmental measures. EIARTR has
touched on the core interest of these local leaders (that is: eco-
nomic development in their region) and this has enhanced priority
given to environmental targets and standards. This measure often
also camewith changed power balances between the different local
governmental agencies, often in favor of environmental protection
bureaus. For instance, after EIA approval was restricted by Sichuan
provincial EPB in 2006, Luzhou municipal government established
an environmental targets-based assessment system to hold
administrative and party leaders responsible for not meeting
environmental targets (Luzhou EPB document no. 177, 2006). This
enhanced the power of the local EPB vis-a-vis their economic
counterparts. According to Pan Yue, the then deputy director-
general of SEPA, “the three-month EIARTR in 2007 achieved
much more than any previous enforcement campaign of EIA. It not
only solved some serious environmental problems left over by
history, but also forced local governments to change the track of
development and accelerated the industrial transformation to-
wards sustainable development”.13
Second, in the regions affected by EIA restriction the capacity of
local environmental (or rather: EIA) law enforcement staff was
strengthened and enhanced, and the environmental budget of the
local EPB was increased (both for staff and monitoring equipment).
For instance, in the case of Luzhou the municipal government
immediately approved the additional employment of 4 EPB staff
and planned to appoint an additional 10 staff members to enhance
environmental investigation and supervision, which did materi-
alize. At the same time, budgets for both operation and equipment
were increased (Luzhou EPB document no. 177, 2006).
Third, EIARTR did temporarily stop industrial investment in
polluting industries and projects, but it is unclear what the longer
term environmental effects have been. After lifting the restrictions
industrial investment and output often increasedmore than before,
but it is unclear whether this industrial output was of a different,13 See SEPA (2007), Lvliang Liupanshui and Huadian Corporation lastly relieved
from restriction, SEPA will draw lessons from the past and seek for more, http://
www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/200910/t20091023_180066.htm, accessed 1
October 2012.less polluting, nature. For instance, the EIA restrictions in Luzhou
lasted for two months (26 December 2006 to 26 February 2007),
and came together with a major set-back in industrial investments,
and even a small set back in industrial output growth during these
months. But during the two months after that period, industrial
investment was higher than before the restrictions, as was indus-
trial output growth.14 However, it is not possible to relate these
changes in industrial investment and output causally to changes in
environmental performance.
Fourth, some environmental targets were achieved to a certain
extent through applying EIARTR, especially when the EIA restric-
tion aimed at major environmental accidents in the region. For
instance, MEP imposed the EIA restriction to Huzhou municipality
in 2011 following a major lead pollution accident. MEP required
Zhejiang provincial EPB to ensure that Huzhou government
investigated and punished the responsible enterprises and scruti-
nized all enterprises involved in heavy metals. Enterprises that did
not have an EIA or did not implement the EIA adequately had to
stop operations. And the most severe environmental pollution
problems with most complaints had to be addressed before the set
deadline and the responsible persons had to be punished (MEP
document no.584, 2011). In MEP's notice to Zhejiang provincial EPB
on lifting the restriction, MEP argued that based on the on-site
investigations and checks by both of them, MEP trusted that Huz-
hou had met the required conditions for lifting the restriction.
Hence, this would indeed point at a signiﬁcant environmental
improvement and an effective instrument to obtain such im-
provements (MEP document no. 1267, 2011).
Fifth, one could also imagine that frequent application of EIARTR
may result in a preventive effect towards local and provincial
governments. The possibility of being targeted for EIA restrictions
in their jurisdiction might lead local leaders to take action to pre-
vent a condition where EIA restriction could be enforced upon
them. It is rather difﬁcult to prove such a preventive effect and no
such indications have been found yet. A sound legal basis of these
measures, implementation of transparency, apply a longer time
period and more experience with EIARTR makes such preventive
behavior of local environmental authorities more likely.
Finally, up till now application and thus environmental effec-
tiveness of such EIA restriction measures obviously has been
limited. There exist numerous situations in China where ambient
environmental standards or total emissions in a region have been
exceeded, but where EIA restrictions were not applied. A most
notable and well-known case would be Beijing air pollution by for
instance power companies and Beijing ambient air quality. For
political reasons it is highly unlikely that EIA restrictions will be
easily applied in such a situation/region, which severely limits the
environmental effectiveness of the measure.4.3. Transparency and public participation
Legitimacy of EIARTR can be enhanced through transparency
and if third parties are informed and can be involved in decision-
making on these restrictions and their revocation. But up till now
transparency and third party participation in EIA restrictions have
been very limited.
Setting restrictions on EIA approval for a region is not a very
transparent process. There is only one announcement by the MEP
or the provincial EPB regarding the criteria that need to be fulﬁlled
in order for the EIA restriction to be lifted. Notices on EIA re-
strictions are not disclosed systematically at one and the same14 This information was provided by Luzhou Municipal Statistics Bureau.
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MEP. This all makes it very difﬁcult for third parties to gain
knowledge of EIA restriction announcements and of the criteria
that are used for their revocation.
Moreover, lifting the EIA restriction is not very transparent and
often the criteria formulated and applied for lifting the restriction
are very general and not speciﬁed. Most likely, a lower level EPB of
the region affected by EIA restriction will (have to) submit a
detailed document to the higher level environmental authority
specifying the fulﬁllment of the conditions and criteria, but these
documents are not disclosed to third parties or the public. In some
cases, the time between installment and lifting the EIA restrictions
has been very short, which poses doubts whether the shortcomings
that resulted in the EIA restriction could actually be overcome on
such short notice. There is no third party that can review the pro-
cedure and the decision to lift the restrictions.
There is also a sense of measuring with different standards. The
MEP is the leading organization within the Chinese government
with respect to advocating open information and transparency as
far as lower level environmental authorities and industrial pol-
luters are concerned (e.g. Mol et al., 2011). The Ministry has also
installed detailed guidelines regarding what information should be
put in project EIA reports and which parts should be disclosed. And
it has installed the possibility for the public to ask for a public
hearing on a project EIA, where the public should be asked and
heard regarding its opinion on the environmental consequences of
the project alternatives. But all these measures of transparency and
public involvement are not included in the case of EIARTR. There is
no possibility for a public hearing on EIA restrictions, third parties
cannot ask for an EIA restriction, and hardly any information on EIA
restriction is disclosed to third parties, the media or the public.
Hence, it seems that MEP asks others to disclose environmental
information but does not disclose environmental informationwhen
MEP itself is the subject of decision-making.
This limited transparency and possibilities for third party
involvement and participation reduce not only the EIARTR legiti-
macy (and thus support), but also enhance the possibilities of other
governmental actors to block continuation of EIARTR, for instance
through acceptance of a sound legal basis for this measure. While
regarding several other radical environmental protection measures
MEP has sought the support and countervailing powers of civil
society to overcome intra-governmental opponents, with respect to
EIARTR such societal backing is absent. The difﬁculty of inserting a
sound legal basis for EIA restrictions during the revision process of
the Environmental Protection Law provides evidence of these intra-
governmental opponents against EIARTR.
5. Conclusion
The current form in which the measure of EIA restrictions has
been established in China can be interpreted as a typical example of
environmental authoritarianism, with its strengths and ﬂaws. The
measure can be considered environmental effective to a certain
extent (as far as it can be assessed), although not always for the
purpose it was designed: improving total regional environmental
quality up to standard. But more importantly EIARTR lacks legiti-
macy with respect to a sound legal basis, transparency and possi-
bilities for third party involvement. While overall China's
environmental policy shows an increase in the rule of law, exper-
iments with third party involvement and the furthering of trans-
parency (Kostka and Mol, 2013), with respect to EIARTR this is not
(yet) the case. On the short term this might not endanger envi-
ronmental effectiveness of EIA restrictions, but on the longer term
this lack of legitimacy might very well undermine the environ-
mental effectiveness of this measure, and can even ﬁre back to thewider legitimacy, credibility and trust in China's environmental
policies and institutions, including its MEP (He et al., 2012).
Hence, several recommendations can be formulated to revise
EIARTR in order to make it ﬁt for the long term. First, a sound legal
basis should be formulated for this measure, with better and more
detailed procedures on its application and on lifting of the re-
strictions. If this does not take place the EIA restrictions deprive the
rights of projects that behave according to all rules and regulations.
Second, transparency and information disclosure should be
enhanced regarding the basis of setting restrictions as well as lifting
restrictions, so that those affected by the measures (companies)
and those potentially affected by the lifting of the restrictions (local
communities, environmental NGOs) can be informed and involved.
Third, a possibility should be created for third parties to ask for EIA
restrictions or ask for the lifting of restrictions, empowering and
involving those living in polluted regions with better possibilities to
improve their quality of life. Fourth, regional restrictions in EIA
approval should be applied only and consistently for those situa-
tions it was meant to be (as formulated in the draft legal basis):
regions where total emission and ambient environmental quality
requirements are not met. Applying such a measure for all kinds of
other environmental misbehavior enhances the arbitrariness of and
objections against its use.
Only with these changes EIARTR can function not only as an
innovative, but also as a legitimate, environmental policy instru-
ment in China, and can thus serve as a best practice to be trans-
ferred to other countries.Acknowledgment
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